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I. Introduction
Local patent rules are proliferating.  As of 
April 2011, there are eighteen district courts with local 
patent rules.1  The first was the Northern District of 
California in 2000, and since then other district courts 
have followed suit with accelerating pace.   Even courts 
without formal local patent rules sometimes apply the 
local patent rules of another court upon the litigants’ 
request or the judge’s own volition.2 
Local patent rules regulate many crucial issues 
in patent litigation, such as discovery obligations, 
claim construction, and time to trial.  The local patent 
rules are beneficial because they streamline a patent 
case and thus help manage the complexity of patent 
cases.3   They also provide a standard structure and 
promote consistency and certainty in how patent cases 
are managed.4  Even further, they alleviate inefficiencies 
by addressing issues that tend to recur in most patent 
cases.5
The local patent rules vary considerably from 
one forum to the next.  In fact, the collection of the 
local patent rules is myriad and diverse, leading to 
disuniformity and balkanization in patent procedure.  
The diversity of local patent rules, however, also allows 
flexibility to experiment with innovative approaches to 
patent procedure. 
This article proposes a system for patent 
procedure that strikes a balance between uniformity 
and experimentation.  Under this system, a central 
agency coordinates the process of experimentation and 
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. 
2010.  Northwestern University, B.S. in Biomedical Engineering, 
2005.
1.  These courts are N.D. Cal., S.D. Cal., N.D. Ga., D. Idaho, 
N.D. Ill., S.D. Ind., D. Mass., D. Minn., E.D. Mo., E.D.N.C., 
W.D.N.C., D.N.J., N.D. Ohio., S.D. Ohio, W.D. Pa., E.D. Tex., 
S.D. Tex, and W.D. Wash.
2.  See e.g., Server Tech., Inc. v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 
No. 3:06-CV-00698-LRH-VPC, 2010 WL 1688721, at *1 (D. 
Nev. Apr. 26, 2010); Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys., 
Inc., 658 F.Supp.2d 988, 993 (D. Neb. 2009); Convolve, Inc. v. 
Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00-5141, 2006 WL 2527773, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2006).
3.  E.g., D. Minn. LR 2005 Patent Advisory Committee’s 
Preface.
4.  Id. 
5.  Id.
ensures a uniform, national perspective.  
This article is comprised of five parts.  Part II 
examines the history of the Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 (“CJRA”), which created a vast collection of 
local rules in civil procedure.  Parts II.A-B examine 
the primary rationale supporting local rulemaking, 
namely experimentation, as well as the criticisms 
attacking local rulemaking, namely balkanization and 
disuniformity.  Part II.C discusses the disappointing 
results of the CJRA, and investigates the reasons for 
those shortcomings.  Parts III-IV discuss the extent 
of the variability between the local patent rules and 
the impact it has on the national patent system.  Part 
V finishes with a proposal, based on lessons from the 
CJRA, to create a central agency for patent procedure.  
II. A History Lesson from the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990
Balkanization of local rules is not a new 
phenomenon; it was also present during the aegis of 
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (“CJRA”).6   The 
overarching goal of the CJRA was reform of civil 
litigation, and its proponents believed that “reform 
must come from ‘the bottom up’ – that is, from 
those who must live with the civil justice system on a 
regular basis.”7  Thus, the CJRA required each of the 
ninety-four district courts to experiment with different 
solutions to combat cost and delay in civil litigation.8  
During this period, local rulemaking was in overdrive.  
A. The Rationale Behind the CJRA: Local 
Experimentation and Innovation
Supporters of the CJRA urged that local 
experimentation would lead to innovative solutions.9  
The CJRA envisioned that each of the ninety-four 
district courts would be a laboratory, in much the 
6.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note on 2000 
amendments.
7.  S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6817.
8.  28 U.S.C.A. § 471 (2010) (no longer in force).
9.  Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 
and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Can Systemic Ills Afflicting The Federal Courts be Remedied by Local 
Rules?, 67 St. John’s Rev. 721, 728 (1993).
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same way that states are seen as laboratories.10  Justice 
Brandeis famously remarked that “[i]t is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may . . . try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”11  
Similarly, under the local experimentation system 
of the CJRA, a single district court could try novel 
experiments without risk to the entire court system.  
In this vein, local district courts have been favorably 
characterized as “useful testing grounds.”12  
B. Criticisms Attacking the CJRA
 Unfortunately, the benefits of experimentation 
come at the price of disuniformity, which brings with it 
a host of problems.  
1. Legal Clutter: Complexity, Confusion, 
and Inefficiency 
The proliferation of local differences creates 
what Professor Paul Carrington calls “legal clutter.”13  
Legal clutter creates complexity, confusion, less 
understanding of the local rules, and more billable 
hours.14  Lawyers find it inordinately difficult 
to practice in more than one jurisdiction, even 
though the federal court system is supposed to be 
national.15  Navigating through this “minefield,” as one 
commentator describes it, inevitably leads to missteps 
and errors.16   As errors are made, litigants are harmed, 
and court time and billable hours are spent fixing the 
errors.17   All this increases expenses, enhances delays, 
creates inefficiencies, and hinders the vindication of 
substantive rights.18 
2.   Unfairness, Unpredictability, and Forum 
Shopping 
Additionally, the variation of local rules 
undermines some of the core foundational principles 
of our legal system.  A common underpinning of 
10.  A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the 
Division of Power, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1581 (1991).
11.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
12.  Cavanagh, supra note 9, at 733.
13.  Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in 
the Federal Courts, 45 Duke L.J. 929, 947-48 (1996).
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. at 948. 
16.  See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: 
The Proliferation of Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 1, 27 (1997) (discussing the variation of local rules in the 
context of appellate courts). 
17.  Id. at 31.
18.  Id. at 27.
procedural justice is that like cases should be treated 
alike.19  But because of the variation in local rules, 
equally meritorious cases are treated unfairly through 
the application of different local rules.  When the 
outcome of a case is susceptible to variations in the 
local rules, the unpredictability that ensues threatens 
the legal system as well.  Citizens begin to lose faith 
in the court system if the results seem random.20  The 
diverse collection of local rules further stimulates forum 
shopping, which exacerbates the problems of unfairness 
and unpredictability.21 
C. Reasons Why Experimentation Under the 
CJRA Was Not Successful  
In 1997, the CJRA sunsetted.22  In its 
concluding observations, the Judicial Conference 
reported that “the process of experimentation and 
innovation under the CJRA raises serious questions 
about the relative balance between national uniformity 
and local option.”23  Multiple commentators noted 
that the local experiments were futile and that the 
level of disuniformity caused too many problems.  The 
same could be said of the local variations in patent 
procedure.  After all, the arguments supporting and 
attacking the proliferation of local rulemaking are no 
different in the context of local patent rules than in 
the context of the CJRA.  But first, it would be wise to 
diagnose the problems with the CJRA.   
A critical flaw of local experimentation under 
the CJRA was its “bottom up” approach, under which 
each district court adopted its own experimental local 
rules.24  To demonstrate why this is problematic, 
Professors Rubin and Feeley make an analogy to 
medical research.25  In medical research, the researcher 
does not ask her subjects to evaluate their own 
medical conditions and then follow whatever course of 
treatment they desire.26  Yet this was essentially what 
the CJRA was asking the district courts to do.  In the 
medical research example, the subjects are not experts 
19.  William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil 
Procedure, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1865, 1893 (2002).
20.  Id. 
21.  Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The 
Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 757, 777-78 
(1995).
22.  Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 
103(b)(2), 104 Stat. 5089, 5096.  
23.  Judicial Conference, The Civil Justice Reform Act 
of 1990 Final Report 45 (1997).
24.  Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 21, at 789, 791.
25.  Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some 
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 926 (1994).
26.  Id. 
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in medicine, they are not given any guidance from the 
medical researcher, and the medical researcher imposes 
no control over the experiment. 
The flaws in the local rulemaking system under 
the CJRA are analogous.  Only experts in social science 
and empirical research were capable of performing the 
complex directives of the CJRA: identify the principal 
causes of cost and delay in civil litigation, identify 
trends in case filings and demands on the court’s 
resources, and examine the extent to which costs and 
delays could be reduced.27  The advisory groups to 
whom these tasks were assigned were composed of 
“attorneys and other . . . representative[s] of major 
categories of litigants.”28  They may very well have 
been accomplished people, but when it came to social 
science expertise, empirical research, and rulemaking, 
they have been described as “lay” and “amateur.”29  
Furthermore, the CJRA did not equip the advisory 
groups with any evaluative criteria, guidelines, or 
techniques for performing the tasks the CJRA assigned. 
30  The advisory groups were left in a “methodological 
lurch.”31 
It is therefore no surprise that the district 
courts used different methods, baselines, and 
assumptions in executing the mandates of the 
CJRA.32  There were no control groups and no one 
was controlling the grander experimentation scheme.33   
As a result, the “data” generated by these experiments 
could not be used as a basis for construing meaningful 
conclusions.34  In the meanwhile, unnecessary 
balkanization emerged. 
The critical missing element to the success 
of local experimentation was an overseeing central 
agency.35  A central agency was needed to design and 
control experiments with expertise and analyze data in 
a scientific manner.36 
The local patent rules are on track to repeat 
the fate of the CJRA.  If the local patent rules are 
allowed to perpetuate from the “bottom-up,” the price 
27.  See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in 
Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375, 405 (1992); 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 472(c) (1990) (no longer in force). 
28.  28 U.S.C.A. § 478(a)-(b) (1990) (no longer in force). 
29.  Mullenix, supra note 27, at 405.
30.  See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5089; Mullenix, supra note 27, at 402.  
31.  Mullenix, supra note 27, at 404.
32.  Id. at 403.




will be unnecessary disuniformity and balkanization.  
Additionally, the local rule experiments will not reach 
their full potential to produce innovations in patent 
procedure.  
III.   Balkanization of the Local Patent Rules
Part III illustrates the extent of balkanization 
of the local patent rules by surveying the local patent 
rules of eighteen district courts, with a specific focus 
on contention and document production rules, which 
regulate discovery. 
A. Background About Contentions and 
Document Production Rules
Contentions and document production rules 
require the parties to disclose early in the litigation 
the specifics about their infringement theories.  For 
example, the patent-holder must disclose which patent 
claims it is asserting against which products of the 
infringer,37 and the accused-infringer must disclose its 
theories of invalidity.38  
The impetus for contentions and document 
production rules was the “shifting sands” problem.39  
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s simplified 
notice pleading system, parties often recited only the 
bare bones of their allegations against each other.40  
This left each party unsure about the opposing party’s 
theories.41   As a result, the initial theories that each 
party offered were hedged and susceptible to change.42  
Parties would, for example, assert different patent 
claims or different pieces of prior art.43  The true issues 
in dispute were not ascertained until the late stages of 
discovery. 44   Contentions and document production 
rules alleviate these problems by requiring the parties 
to promptly disclose the bases for their underlying 
claims.45  Thereby, local patent rules crystallize theories 
early in the case.46  
37.  E.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1.
38.  Id. at 3-3.
39.  Peter S. Mennell et al., Patent Case Management 
Judicial Guide 1-1, 2-9 (Federal Judicial Center) (2009) (citing 
LG Elecs., Inc. v. Q-Lity Computer, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 367 
(N.D. Cal. 2002)).
40.  Id. at 2-8.  But see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 
1940 (2009) (raising the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2) to one of “facial plausibility”).
41.  Mennell, supra note 39, at 2-8 – 2-9.
42.  Id. at 2-9.
43.  Id. 
44.  Id.
45.  See, e.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1 – 3-4
46.  Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., No. C 95-
1987, 1998 WL 775115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5 1998).
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B. Balkanization of Contentions and Document 
Production Rules
All the forums require Infringement 
Contentions and Invalidity Contentions, but the 
information that must be disclosed in these contentions 
varies dramatically.  To demonstrate the degree of 
variation between these rules,  the rules of all eighteen 
district courts with local patent rules are surveyed: 47 (1) 
Northern District of California, (2) Southern District 
of California, (3) Northern District of Georgia, (4) 
District of Idaho, (5) Northern District of Illinois, 
(6) Southern District of Indiana, (7) District of 
Massachusetts, (8) District of Minnesota, (9), Eastern 
District of Missouri, (10) District of New Jersey, (11) 
Eastern District of North Carolina, (12), Western 
District of North Carolina, (13) Northern District of 
Ohio, (14), Southern District of Ohio, (15) Western 
District of Pennsylvania, (16) Eastern District of Texas, 
(17) Southern District of Texas, and (18) Western 
District of Washington.
1. Infringement Contentions  
Each district court requires the patent-holder 
to disclose some combination of the categories of 
information listed below.  
1. each claim that the patent-holder is 
asserting against the accused-infringer 
2. for each claim, the applicable subsection of 
35 U.S.C. § 271 
3. a specific identification of each product/
method of the accused-infringer that the 
patent-holder alleges is infringing 
4. a claim chart that maps the limitations of 
the asserted claims to the limitations of the 
accused product/method 
5. if there are means-plus-function 
limitations in the asserted claims, 
identification of the structure in the 
accused product/method that performs the 
claimed function 
6. whether the patent-holder is asserting 
literal infringement or infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents for each 
asserted claim limitation 
7. details on allegations of indirect 
infringement 
8. bases for allegations of willful infringement 
47.  Much of this information was collected with the help of 
Travis M. Jensen, Patent Local Rules--A Summary and Comparison, 
997 PLI/Pat 959, 981 (2010).  
9. priority dates to which each claim is 
entitled 
10. identification of the patent-holder’s 
own products/methods that practice the 
claimed invention if the patent-holder 
wishes to rely on those products/methods 
for any purpose  
The table that follows highlights the divergence 




48. S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.1.
49. S.D. Ind. Case Management Plan for Patent Cases Phase I, III.C.
50. E.D.N.C. Civ. R. 303.1.
51. W.D. Pa. LPR 3.1.
52. E.D. Tex. P. R. 3-1.
53. S.D. Tex. P. R. 3-1.
54. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-1.
55. D. Idaho Loc. Patent R. 3.1.
56. N.D. Ill. LPR 2.2.
57. D.N.J. L. Pat. R. 3.1.
58. D. Mass. LR 16.6 App. (A)(1). 
59. D. Minn. LR 16.2 Form 4 (f )(1).
60. N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.1.
61. N.D. Ohio L.P.R. 3.1.
62. W.D. Wash. Local Patent Rules 120.
63. W.D.N.C. P.R. 3.1.
64. E.D. Mo. Local Patent R. 3-1.
65. S.D. Ohio. Pat.L.R. 103.2.
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2. Invalidity Contentions 
 The substance of the accused-infringer’s 
Invalidity Contentions similarly varies across the 
forums.  Depending on the forum, the accused-
infringer must disclose some combination of the 
following categories of information in its Invalidity 
Contentions:  
1. identification of prior art of which the accused-
infringer is currently aware 
2. whether each item of prior art anticipates each 
asserted claim or renders it obvious 
3. an explanation of why the prior art renders a 
claim obvious  
a. Some local rules provide a general 
requirement that the accused-infringer 
explain its obviousness contentions.  
b. Other local rules spell out what 
information the accused-infringer 
must include in its obviousness 
contentions.  Specifically, these local 
rules may require an identification 
of the combinations of prior art that 
render a claim obvious and/or the 
motivation to combine those pieces of 
prior art.
4. a claim chart that maps the limitations of the 
asserted claims to the limitations of the prior 
art 
5. if there are means-plus-function limitations 
in the asserted claims, the chart must identify 
the structure in the prior art that performs the 
claimed function 
6. Other grounds of invalidity 
a. Some sets of local rules provide a 
general requirement that the accused-
infringer must disclose grounds of 
invalidity.  
b. Other sets of local rules spell out the 
grounds of invalidity for which the 
accused-infringer must disclose details. 
The grounds of invalidity specified by 
these local rules include non-statutory 
subject matter, indefiniteness, lack 
of enablement, lack of written 
description, and violations of best 
mode.  
The table below charts the differences between the 
invalidity contention rules in each forum: 
50 Spring 2011
 666768697071727374757677787980818283
66. N.D. Ill. LPR 2.3(b).
67. S.D. Ind. Case Management Plan for Patent Cases Phase I III.D.
68. W.D. Pa. LPR 3.3.
69. E.D. Tex. P. R. 3-3.
70. S.D. Ohio. Pat.L.R. 103.4.
71. N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3.
72. D. Idaho Loc. Patent R. 3.3.
73. D.N.J. L. Pat. R. 3.3.
74. S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.3.
75. E.D. Mo. Local Patent R. 3-4.
76. N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3.
77. D. Mass. LR 16.6 App. (A)(2).
78. D. Minn. LR 16.2 Form 4 (g)(1).
79. E.D.N.C. Local Civil Rule 303.3.
80. N.D. Ohio L.P.R. 3.5(a)-(d).
81. S.D. Tex. P. R. 3-3.
82. W.D. Wash. Local Patent Rules 121.
83. W.D.N.C. P.R. 3.3.
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C. The Federal Circuit’s General Non-Interference 
Policy 
 The survey of the local patent rules on 
contentions and document productions reveals a 
staggering array of differences.  One possible way 
to hone the collection of local rules is through the 
authority of the Federal Circuit, which has the power 
to adjudge local patent rules invalid, as well as the 
authority to review a district court’s interpretation and 
application of local rules.84  However, given the Federal 
Circuit’s acclaim of local patent rules, it is unlikely that 
the Federal Circuit would adjudge any of the current 
local patent rules invalid.85  Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit has expressed a preference not to step in and 
overrule the district courts on matters of interpreting 
and applying local patent rules.86  
 Without any central authority regulating the 
local patent rules, the disuniformity of the local patent 
rules will likely become more severe as more courts 
adopt local patent rules. 
IV. The Benefits and Harms Flowing from 
Variations Between the Local Patent Rules
The vast and diversified collection of local 
patent rules has disrupted uniformity, but it has also 
led to innovations through experimentation.  Parts IV. 
A-G. provide specific examples.  
A. Benefits Flowing from Variations Between the 
Local Patent Rules 
1. The Creation of the Local Patent Rules
The patent community widely regards the 
local patent rules in themselves as positive.  They 
help manage the complexity of patent cases, provide 
some degree of predictability, and create efficiencies 
by regulating the same issues that tend to recur.87  The 
Federal Circuit has also applauded the local patent rules 
for crystallizing theories early in the case.88 
84.  O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d 
1355, 1365-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
85.  See id. at 1365-66 (explaining that the local patent rules 
“seek to balance the right to develop new information in discovery 
with the need for certainty as to the legal theories”).
86.  Genentech v. Amgen, 289 F.3d 761, 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
See also Sandisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 
1292 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that the Federal Circuit gives 
“broad deference” to the trial court’s application of local patent 
rules); Safeclick, LLC v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 208 Fed. Appx. 829, 
834 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that the standard of review over a 
district court’s application of local patent rules is “very deferential”).
87.  See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.  
88.  O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1365-66 n.12 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).
The local patent rules exist in large part 
because local experimentation made them possible.  
The first court to adopt local patent rules was the 
Northern District of California in 2001.89  For three 
years it was the only court with local patent rules,90 
presumably because the idea of a specialized set of local 
rules for patent law was novel and untested.  After 
numerous patent cases were litigated on the N.D. 
Cal.’s “testing ground,” it can be assumed that the 
local patent rules reaped enough apparent benefit to 
influence multiple other courts into adopting their own 
local patent rules.91  In drafting each successive set of 
local patent rules, the courts seemed to observe and 
learn from each other’s experiences and contribute their 
own variations to their local patent rules.92  Therefore, 
the local patent rules today appear to be a product of 
localized “trial-runs” and a build-up of experiences.
2. Innovative Approaches to Claim 
Construction Briefing
 Local experimentation also makes possible 
innovations in specific procedural issues.  The Northern 
District of Illinois’s procedures for claim construction 
briefing are one such example.  The Northern District 
of Illinois is the only court that requires the accused-
infringer to open claim construction briefing.93  In all 
the other district courts, the patent-holder files the first 
claim construction brief.94  When the patent-holder 
files the first brief, it often argues for “plain meaning” 
constructions.95  Then, the accused-infringer offers 
its constructions in its response brief.96  Only in its 
reply and closing brief does the patent-holder finally 
offer detailed constructions.97  This method left the 
89.  N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 1-3 (2000).
90.  The first court to adopt local patent rules after the N.D. 
Cal. was the N.D. Ga. in 2004.  See N.D. Ga. LPR 1.3 (explaining 
that the effective date of the local patent rules is July 15, 2004). 
91.  James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, 
Application and Influence of the Northern District of California’s Local 
Rules, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 965,  1007-
08 (2009). 
92.  E.g., D. Minn. LR 2005 Patent Advisory Committee’s 
Preface; D.N.J. L. Pat. R. Report of the Local Rules Committee; 
Judge Matthew F. Kennelly & Edward D. Manzo, Northern District 
of Illinois Adopts Local Patent Rules, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. 
Prop. L. 202, 204-05 (2009).
93.  N.D. Ill. LPR 4.2.
94.  E.g., N.D. Cal. 4-5. 
95.  R. David Donoghue, New Northern District of Illinois 





accused-infringer without a chance to reply.98  The 
Northern District of Illinois  hoped that its method, 
which requires the accused-infringer to open claim 
construction briefing, would lead to a more focused 
debate.99  
B. Harms Flowing From Variations Between the 
Local Patent Rules 
1. Legal Clutter: Complexity, Confusion, 
and Inefficiency 
 While small variations between the different 
sets of local rules represent innovations, they are 
also the source of legal clutter.  Keeping up with the 
minutia of all the different sets of local patent rules 
can become inordinately complex, confusing, and 
inefficient.100  And it is important to know the local 
patent rules in detail, because non-compliance can 
leave a case in ruins.  For example, in Genentech v. 
Amgen, the patent-holder was precluded from asserting 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because 
it failed to assert the doctrine of equivalents in its claim 
charts as required by the local rules.101  
It is understandable that a litigant can become 
confused about whether it is required to disclose 
a certain theory in its contentions.  For example, 
different forums take different approaches to the issue 
of disclosing a “best mode” theory of invalidity.102  
The different approaches can be grouped into three 
categories: 
1) Best mode is specifically identified and must be 
disclosed103 
2) “[A]ny grounds of invalidity based on any 
applicable provision under 35 U.S.C. § 112” 
must be disclosed, but best mode is not 
specifically identified104 
3) “[A]ny grounds of invalidity based on 
indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) or 
enablement or written description under 35 
U.S.C. § 112(1)” must be disclosed, but best 
98.  Id.
99.  N.D. Ill. LPR 4.2. Comment.
100.  See discussion supra Part. II.B.1.
101.  Genentech v. Amgen, 289 F.3d 761, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); See also I-Flow Corp., v. Apex Med. Tech., No. 07-1200, 
2008 WL  2899822, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (finding that 
the accused-infringers waived their argument that certain claim 
terms should be construed as means-plus-function elements because 
they did not disclose this theory in their invalidity contentions).
102.  See discussion supra Part III.A.4.
103.  E.g., S.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3.3(e).  
104.  E.g., N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3(a)(4) (emphasis added).
mode is not specifically identified105 
 The Northern District of California’s local 
patent rules fall into the third category.106  In fact, for 
some time, there was confusion over whether those 
rules required disclosure of “best mode.”107  In Fresenius 
Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., the 
patent-holder moved to strike the accused-infringer’s 
“best mode” argument because it failed to disclose “best 
mode” in its invalidity contentions.108  The patent-
holder argued that disclosure of “best mode” was 
required in invalidity contentions.109  The court held 
that technically, the Northern District of California’s 
local patent rules do not require disclosure of a “best 
mode” theory.110  
The confusion over “best mode”—whether 
it must be disclosed in invalidity contentions—
represents just one example of the problems caused by 
disuniformity and balkanization.  
2. Unfairness, Unpredictability, and 
Forum Shopping 
 Unfairness is another problem created by 
disuniformity and balkanization of the local patent 
rules.  To illustrate this point, best mode is again a 
useful example.  In Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 
the court explained the rationale for not requiring the 
accused-infringer to disclose a “best mode” theory in 
its invalidity contentions: “The rationale for this is 
clear; an accused infringer typically does not have the 
evidence necessary to establish its best mode defense 
until much later in the discovery process.”111  What is 
not so clear, however, is why other forums’ invalidity 
contention rules nevertheless require the accused-
infringer to disclose a best mode defense.  Accused-
infringers as a group are comparably situated with 
regard to their ability to gather evidence to establish a 
best mode defense—irrespective of the forum in which 
their case is heard.  Thus, it is unfair that some accused-
infringers are held to stricter requirements for arguing a 
best mode defense, merely because they are in a forum 
with a different set of local patent rules.
105.  E.g., N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3(d) (emphasis added).
106.  Id.
107.  See Ware & Davy, supra note 86, at 991 (noting 
ambiguity in N.D. Cal. Patent L.R. 3-3(d) regarding disclosure of 
best mode).
108.  Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 
No.03-1431, 2006 WL 1329997 at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006).
109.  Id.
110.  Id. at *6.
111.  Id. at *5.
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The different sets of local patent rules have 
even more widespread implications on substantive 
justice.  As the Federal Circuit acknowledged, “issues 
concerning the validity and interpretation of such local 
[patent] rules are ‘intimately involved in the substance 
of enforcement of the patent right.’”112  Commentators 
agree that differences in local patent rules can be 
outcome determinative.113
Given the import that local patent rules have 
on a patent case, it is no surprise that local patent rules 
are a key factor in the game of forum shopping.114  
Commentators opine that patent-holders’ favoritism of 
the Eastern District of Texas, for instance, is due partly 
to its local patent rules,115  which have been described 
as “shift[ing] the balance toward the plaintiff”116 and as 
“stack[ing] the deck against the defendant.”117  
 The disuniformity of the local patent 
rules further leads to problems of unpredictability.  
Unpredictability is acutely harmful in patent law 
because patent law’s primary objective is to motivate 
future behavior.118  If patent rights are uncertain, 
some competitors will attribute patent-holders with 
an unduly large “zone of no competition.”119  Then, 
if competitors choose to compete with the patented 
product, they will do so in a less than optimal fashion, 
depriving the public of cheaper and higher-quality 
goods that competition engenders.120  In other cases, 
competitors will attribute an unduly small “zone of 
no competition” to patent-holders, and therefore they 
will infringe patents more frequently.121  This decreases 
the value of the patent to the patent-holder and the 
incentive to innovate.122  
3. Undermining the Uniformity of 
Substantive Patent Law
112.  O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., 467 F.3d 
1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
113.  Jensen, supra note 49, at 967.  See also Yan Leychkis, Of 
Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric 
Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent 
Litigation, 9 Yale J.L. & Tech. 193, 224 (2007) (opining that that 
the odds of winning a case are impacted by the local patent rules).
114.  Leychkis, supra note 113, at 224.
115.  E.g. id. at 209.
116.  Id. at 222.
117.  Id. at 219.
118.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1989).
119.  Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: 
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 558, 593-94 (2001).
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. at 593.
122.  Id.
Of all the harms that attend the disuniformity 
of local patent rules, perhaps the most important is 
the undercutting of a uniform body of substantive 
patent law.  Within the body of substantive patent 
law that is supposed to be uniform, the law on 
obviousness is one area of concern.  In particular, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc.123 is not embodied uniformly and consistently in 
the local patent rules.  The Supreme Court in KSR 
deemphasized the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” 
test for finding obviousness.124  In other words, to 
prove that a patent claim is obvious, it is not always 
necessary to point to a motivation to combine prior 
art references, because obviousness can be proven in 
other ways.125  In recognition of KSR, the Northern 
District of California amended its 2000 version of 
the local patent rules in 2008 by eliminating the 
requirement to identify a motivation to combine in 
an accused-infringer’s invalidity contentions.126  In 
contrast, a significant number of other local patent 
rule jurisdictions retain the requirement to identify a 
motivation to combine.127  
V. A Proposal Based on Lessons from the 
CJRA: Create a Central Agency for Patent 
Procedure
The problems inherent in the disuniformity 
of patent procedure have caught the attention of 
the patent bar, and many patent attorneys have 
endorsed national uniformity of local patent rules.128  
Consummate unification of the local patent rules, 
however, would mean the end of local experimentation. 
On the other hand, maintaining the status quo 
incubates disuniformity and balkanization.
Fortunately, past experience with the CJRA 
informs a solution to this dilemma.  Specifically, the 
creation of a central agency should minimize the 
harms caused by disuniformity and maximize the 
benefits of local experimentation.129  Therefore, this 
123.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
124.  Id. at 419.  
125.  Id. at 419-421.  
126.  Ware & Davy, supra note 86, at 1004.
127.  E.g., N.D. Ill. LPR 2.3(b); W.D. Pa. LPR 3.3.; E.D. Tex. 
P. R. 3-3.; N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.3.
128.  E.g., Ware & Davy, supra note 91, at 1014; Leychkis, 
supra note 113, at 225; Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum 
Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 570, 583 (2007); Jeff Becker, On 
Creating Specialized Patent District Courts: Why H.R. 34 Does Not Go 
Far Enough to Address Reversal Rates in District Courts, 61 SMU L. 
Rev. 1607, 1632 (2008).
129.  See discussion supra Part II.C.
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article proposes that a central agency specializing in 
patent procedure should be created to coordinate local 
experimentation and ensure uniformity. 
One of the primary objectives of the central 
agency should be regulating localized experiments.  To 
ensure the success of these experiments, the central 
agency should be staffed by experts in social science, 
empirical research, statistics, and rulemaking.  
 As a first step to managing local experiments, 
the central agency should plan and design the 
experiments.  It should encourage input from the 
patent community across the nation, conduct research, 
engage in dialogue and debate with members of the 
staff and other professionals, and collect hard data 
representing the performance of the procedural patent 
rules currently in place.  Based on this research, the 
central agency should formulate a hypothesis and 
design a scientifically valid experiment that tests this 
hypothesis.  The central agency should lay out the 
steps of the experiment clearly, prescribe definitive 
guidelines, and provide procedures for gathering and 
reporting hard data.  
 Once the central agency finishes designing 
an experiment, it should conduct a “trial-run” in 
a limited number of district courts.  By limiting 
the number of district courts, the central agency 
minimizes balkanization, minimizes problems inherent 
in disuniformity, and establishes control groups.  In 
addition, it becomes more feasible to test high-risk but 
high-gain innovative procedures that ordinarily would 
not have been tested on the entire nation.  During 
the course of the experiment, the central agency 
should oversee the district court to make sure that the 
experiment runs according to its design.  
 The expertly designed experiments will yield 
valid data, which in turn, serves as a proper basis for 
formulating meaningful conclusions.  The professional 
staff in the central agency will be well-versed in 
analyzing the data accurately, applying stringent 
methodological analysis, performing sophisticated 
statistical analyses, drawing sound inferences, and 
developing effectual reforms for patent procedure.  As 
patent law and patent procedure progressively evolves, 
the central agency should utilize this methodology 
to continually develop new procedures and improve 
existing ones.  
Another key objective of the central agency 
should be ensuring national uniformity in patent 
procedure.  When managing the local experiments, 
the central agency should do so with a national 
perspective—not only by minimizing balkanization, 
but also by taking into consideration how the small-
scale experiments will inform national reform in patent 
procedure.  In addition, when the law changes through 
a decision from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme 
Court, the central agency should make sure those 
changes are properly and consistently integrated into 
the procedural rules in all the district courts.
 Experimentation according to this proposal 
should bear fruit for patent procedure because the 
central agency and its expertise make possible well-
designed experiments, which lead to the development 
of successful reforms.  At the same time, uniformity 
is not unduly sacrificed because the central agency 
oversees patent procedures in the district courts with an 
eye toward national uniformity.  
IV. Conclusion
 The local patent rules have brought many 
benefits to the patent system.  Within a particular 
forum, the local patent rules permit litigants and the 
courts to predict the procedural progression of a case 
with some certainty.  The local patent rules also reduce 
inefficiencies within one forum because they eliminate 
the need to readdress procedural issues that frequently 
recur in each case.  From a policy standpoint, the 
local patent rules are beneficial because they minimize 
gamesmanship in patent litigation and crystallize the 
parties’ theories early in the case.  
 Under the current structure of local patent 
rulemaking, each district court proceeds autonomously.  
An advantage of this structure is local experimentation.  
Indeed, local experimentation played a large role 
in the creation of the local patent rules themselves.  
Additionally, specific procedural issues in patent 
litigation, such as Markman briefing, are showing 
promising signs of innovation as a result of local 
experimentation.  
 Unfortunately, without any control over 
the district courts’ local rulemaking, unnecessary 
balkanization and disuniformity has emerged.  
The consequences are legal clutter, unfairness, 
unpredictability, and forum-shopping. 
 Even though uniformity and local 
experimentation are in tension with each other, 
a favorable balance can be achieved.  The CJRA 
is informative in this respect because local rules 
burgeoned during the CJRA era, similar to the 
development of local patent rules.  Specifically, 
experiences from the CJRA teach that the creation 
of a central agency for patent procedure would be 
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salutary for patent law.  An expertly staffed central 
agency can maximize the value of local experimentation 
and minimize the harms of disuniformity.  In this 
manner, patent procedure can reap the benefits of both 
uniformity and experimentation without sacrificing 
either. 
